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Abstract
This article focuses on the costs and benets of a scal consolidation in a small euro
area economy. The macroeconomic impacts and the welfare analysis are conducted
in a New-Keynesian general equilibrium model with non-Ricardian agents. We dene
a benchmark scal consolidation strategy based on a permanent reduction in Gov-
ernment expenditure. We nd that, over the long run, scal consolidation leads to a
considerable increase in the level of output and consumption, and is welfare improving.
In addition, the gains are boosted if the scal strategy also involves a tax reform that
shifts the tax burden away from labour income towards the nal goods consumption.
However, important short-run costs arise, notably output, consumption and welfare
losses. Finally, we assess the eect of alternative scal consolidation paths in terms of
the degree of front loading, the speed of its completion and the interaction with risk
premium.
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11 Introduction
The Great Recession triggered by the international nancial crisis led to the implemen-
tation of massive scal stimulus plans in many economies. In addition, the injection of
public funds in many troubled nancial institutions assumed also a crucial role in tam-
ing systemic risk. In this context, public debt increased substantially across developed
economies, including the United States, euro area economies, the United Kingdom and
Japan. These developments raised increasing concerns over the public nances sustain-
ability, bringing the discussion on the need of a scal consolidation to the center stage of
the economic policy debate.
In a context of tense global nancing conditions created by increased risk aversion,
the uncertainty on public nances sustainability in many economies led to a reappraisal of
the sovereign debt risk pricing, which translated into an uneven increase in Government
bond yields, in particular across euro area economies. These developments challenged
the widely-held belief that the euro was a bulletproof vest against risk price discrimina-
tion among participant economies, since the common monetary policy coupled with the
Stability and Growth Pact rules were taken as almost ensuring perfect risk-sharing.
The international nancial and economic crisis put in evidence the heterogeneity of
euro area economies and discredit the perfect risk sharing assumption. Those economies
revealing more fragilities, in particular larger scal imbalances, asset price bubbles and/or
higher dependence of the banking system from wholesale international nancial markets,
started to be more discriminated in what respects debt pricing. More precisely, higher
quality sovereign debt experienced a relative price increase against lower quality debt. The
need for credible scal consolidation strategies became more evident after Greece entered
the IMF/European Financial Stability Facility programme. Policymakers in Europe and
the IMF asked for the quick implementation of credible scal consolidation programmes
in the remaining economies under pressure to avoid systemic problems over the entire
euro area, in particular after the collapse of the Irish banking system. Under these cir-
cumstances, the debate on the scal consolidation strategies and the associated costs and
benets became topical.
The article focuses on short, medium and long run impacts on economic activity,
demand conditions and welfare of scal consolidation based on specic scal policy mea-
sures, encompassing permanent cuts in government expenditure and temporary increases
in labour income taxes. The impact of unbalancing the instruments towards a stronger
increase in consumption taxes in exchange for a smaller increase on taxation on labour
income is also analysed, which in the context of a small-open economy integrated in a
monetary union is a possible way of forcing a real exchange rate devaluation, thereby re-
gaining competitiveness and reducing the external imbalance. This might be an important
objective in the case where the scal decit and the external decit (the \twin decits")
are a major topic. The impact of alternative timings to complete scal consolidation is
also addressed. Finally, we consider the case in which the consolidation strategy restores
2credibility, bringing interest rates to levels below the pre-consolidation period.
The article is exclusively focused on the macroeconomic impacts in a small euro area
economy. The discussion is based on PESSOA, a New-Keynesian model described in
Almeida, Castro and F elix (2010). The model was designed and calibrated to t the char-
acteristics of a small open economy (SOE) integrated in a monetary union. This implies
that foreign variables (corresponding to the rest of the monetary union) are assumed to
be orthogonal to domestic developments as in Adolfson, Lase en, Lind e and Villani (2007),
with the stability of the model being granted by the full credibility of the ination objec-
tive and by the large elasticities of real trade variables to real exchange rate uctuations.
Domestic price levels are pinned down by the external constraint that sets a unique steady-
state real exchange rate level. To use an expression from Giavazzi and Pagano (1988), the
SOE in PESSOA is eectively \tying its hands" with the rest of the euro area.
Contrary to most DSGE models in the literature on SOE, PESSOA is intrinsically non-
Ricardian, featuring nite-lifetime households (Blanchard 1985, Yaari 1965), distortionary
taxation and liquidity constrained households (Gal , L opez-Salido and Vall es 2007). These
features, coupled with a rich scal block, make the model particularly suited for scal pol-
icy analysis. In particular, the nite-lifetime framework creates a non-trivial role for scal
policy over the medium and long run, introducing a source of non-Ricardian behaviour ab-
sent in the mainstream innitely-lived agents environment. In addition, this framework al-
lows for the endogenous determination of the net foreign asset position (Harrison, Nikolov,
Quinn, Ramsay, Scott and Thomas 2005), thereby delivering a realistic co-movement be-
tween public debt and the net foreign asset position, in contrast with the innitely lived
agents case (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2003).
The structure of the article is as follows. In section 2, we motivate the analysis and
briey survey some literature. The model is presented in section 3, along with the calibra-
tion strategy. Section 4 addresses the impact of alternative scal consolidation strategies,
with alternative timings, on the main macroeconomic aggregates and on welfare. This
section includes a scenario in which the scal consolidation is accompanied by a reduction
in the domestic risk premium. Section 5 concludes and draws some policy implications.
2 Motivation
The behavior of public debt over the last 15 years has not been homogenous across euro
area countries. Figure 1 reports the public debt ratio in selected Member-states, between
1995 and 2007. Several countries recorded a reduction in debt ratio, while others recorded
signicant increases. Between 2007 and 2009, however, uneven developments disappeared
with all euro area countries sharing an upward trend. Ireland, Spain and the Netherlands
are among those where the increase in public debt in recent years was in clear contrast with
the pre-crisis period, while in Greece and Portugal the deterioration trend aggravated.
The increase in public debt in the recent past occurred against a background of an
international nancial crisis, triggered in August 2007 by mounting problems in the sub-
3prime housing credit in the United States (US). The crisis gained momentum, in a second
phase, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 (Rother, Schuknecht
and Stark 2010). Spring 2010 may have marked the beginning of the third phase of the
international nancial crisis, when concerns over scal positions intensied dramatically
the sovereign debt crisis.
During 2009, scal authorities in many economies (not only in the euro area, but also
elsewhere, including the United States, United Kingdom or Japan) decided to implement
massive scal stimulus, aimed at supporting demand conditions through public invest-
ment plans, increased generosity of transfers to households and non-nancial rms that
were more hardly hit by the crisis, while promoting in some cases a tax burden relief.
The implementation of these discretionary measures, coupled with the operation of the
automatic stabilisers, in a context in which the economic activity suered a major slump
(despite the stimulus measures) and prices declined, led to strong scal imbalances. More-
over, injections of public funds in troubled nancial institutions were also performed to
tame systemic risk.
In an international context dominated by increased risk aversion, nancial market
participants reassessed sovereign debt spreads. In particular, a number of small euro area
economies revealing structural fragilities suered a strong rise in sovereign risk pricing as
measured by the spread of national Government bond yields vis- a-vis Deutsche Bunds.
This was initially the case of Greece, where concerns on the sustainability of the public
nances started well before the nancial crisis, but materialised into soaring debt spreads
only in late 2009 as a huge imbalance started to unveil. In April 2010 Greece asked for
the activation of the IMF/European Financial Stability Facility programme.
Spain, Portugal and Ireland also suered, in early 2010, strong sovereign debt spread
rises after unveiling huge scal imbalances in the 2009 accounts.1 In the case of Spain
and Ireland, the strong growth pace recorded in the last decade largely fueled a housing
market bubble, the burst of which implied a strong adjustment in both households and
the banking sector. In the case of Ireland, the collapse of the banking system implied the
request for a rescue package from IMF and Europe in the end of 2010.
Preliminary data for 2010 and EC forecasts for 2011-12 conrm that government debt
ratios reached \unprecedent peacetime levels" in some cases, to recover a rather worrying
expression of Rother et al. (2010)2, and clear unsustainable dynamics, as depicted in Figure
1. In general, all these developments challenged the widely-held belief that the common
monetary policy coupled with the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact rules
were stringent enough to ensure public nances sustainability and price stability in the
euro area.
1In the case of Portugal, the huge imbalance in 2009 resulted from a discretionary increase in public
expenditure, which can only partly be justied by the stimulus package. For instance, the civil servants
wage scale in the general election year of 2009 was updated by 2.9 per cent, a gure well above all ination
expectations and that materialised ex-post into an increase in real wage close to 4 per cent. This evolution
followed a scal consolidation period initiated in 2005, which brought the scal decit from above 5 per
cent of GDP to below the 3 per cent threshold in 2008.
2Rother et al. (2010), p.6.













































































Source: European Commission. Forecasts from EC (2010), published in
November 2010.
The high public debt levels are particularly worrisome in economies that also have
ongoing long-run sustainability issues, namely due to structural features such as ageing
and its future impacts in social security outlays or developments in health expenditures.
The policy advices of international institutions, calling for a substantial and fast debt
reduction, are addressed theoretically by Caprioli, Rizza and Tommasino (2010). The
results, obtained in a DSGE model, are confronted with those of the mainstream optimal
scal policy literature that calls for debt stabilization.
In this context, restoring debt sustainability after the crises, evaluating the benets of
scal consolidation in the long-run and creating conditions for a successful consolidation
process have become a major focus of the current economic literature (Rother et al. 2010,
Mulas-Granados, Baldacci and Gupta 2010, Barrios, Langedijk and Pench 2010). This
literature addressed several topics. For instance, it is mentioned that scal consolidation
supports scal sustainability both directly and indirectly via positive growth eects, high-
lighting that consolidation can have positive wealth eects on consumption. Furthermore,
scal consolidation improve the availability of funds and reduce the probability of sudden
stops (where all market-based funding ceases), reduces the contingent liabilities across
countries, strengthens the robustness and insurability of the nancial system and reduces
solvency risks. It was also highlighted that the margin of manoeuver to use scal policy
as a countercyclical tool when deemed necessary increases if the economy is in a sound
scal position. The macroeconomic impacts of scal consolidation are also addressed by
Coenen, Mohr and Straub (2008a) using a two country open-economy model. The results
suggest positive long-run impacts on key macroeconomic aggregates, in particular when
the improved budgetary position is used to cut distortionary taxes in the long run.
53 A model for a small euro area economy
This section presents PESSOA, the New-Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium model
behind the analysis of the macroeconomic impacts of a scal consolidation. The model was
used to analyse shocks that hit the Portuguese economy over the last decade in Almeida,
Castro and F elix (2009) and is described in Almeida, Castro and F elix (2010). The model
features a SOE integrated in a fully-edged monetary union, the euro area. It is assumed
from the outset that the rest of the monetary union is not aected by domestic shocks,
implying that monetary policy decisions are orthogonal to domestic developments as in
Adolfson et al. (2007). In the SOE setup, the domestic economy is modelled in detail,
while the rest of the monetary union modeling is very parsimonious. Contrary to most
general equilibrium models in the literature on SOE, PESSOA has intrinsic non-Ricardian
features inspired by the IMF's Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal model (Kumhof,
Muir, Mursula and Laxton 2010).
It is well known that breaking the Ricardian equivalence is of paramount importance
to generate realistic impulse response functions of private consumption in the advent of
a scal shock (Blanchard 1985, Gal  et al. 2007). PESSOA is intrinsically non-Ricardian,
featuring: nitely-lived households in line with the stochastic nite lifetime framework
(Blanchard 1985, Yaari 1965, Buiter 1988, Weil 1989); distortionary taxation on households
consumption, labour and capital income; and hand-to-mouth households (Gal  et al. 2007).
The scal block of the model is detailed enough to account for several types of distortionary
taxation, lump-sum transfers to households (to all or to a targeted group), and government
expenditure.
This setup generates a non-trivial role for scal policy not only in the short-run but
also in the medium and long-run. As claried in Frenkel and Razin (1996) and in Kumhof
and Laxton (2009b), the stochastic nite lifetime framework may generate sizeable wealth
eects of public debt issuance, which are absent in the workhorse innitely-lived agent
framework. In the Blanchard-Yaari-Buiter-Weil world, households strongly prefer debt
issuance to tax nancing of Government expenditure, since future generations will bear
some of the tax burden (Buiter 1988). In addition, this framework allows for the endoge-
nous determination of the net foreign asset position (Harrison et al. 2005), since nite
lifetimes limit the amount of assets/debt that a household can accumulate.3 This repre-
sents an appealing feature for the simulation of permanent scal shocks, since it generates
a positive correlation between public debt and the net foreign debt position of the econ-
omy. On the contrary, in the workhorse innitely lived agents model, the steady-state
net foreign asset position is pinned down exogenously (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2003),
implying that changes in steady-state public debt are fully oset by private saving and
are, by assumption, uncorrelated with the net foreign debt.
3It should be pointed out that by denition a SOE does not aect the world investment-savings balance
and, therefore, the world real interest rate. Hence, innitely lived agents will be able to borrow or lend
in innite amounts that can be paid or received in the indenite future. For further details refer to Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
6Since PESSOA is designed for a SOE integrated in a monetary union, the adjustment
mechanism of the economy to domestic shocks is rather dierent from the standard general
equilibrium model setup, in which monetary policy and real interest rate movements are
crucial to render the model dynamically stable. In PESSOA, monetary policy is trivial in
the sense that the domestic interest rate is orthogonal to domestic shocks and can only
deviate from the rest of the union rate by a risk premium, assumed to be exogenous. This
implies that domestic shocks aecting domestic ination developments tend to generate
powerful eects on the real interest rate, amplifying domestic economy uctuations. The
dynamic stability of the model is ensured instead by an active role of the real exchange
rate (which in the case of an irrevocably xed nominal exchange rate simply reects the
relative price of domestic goods vs. foreign goods) in the adjustment of international
trade in goods and assets. Domestic agents in PESSOA are assumed to trade in goods
and assets/debt solely with agents in the monetary union. Therefore, real exchange rate
uctuations have sizeable impacts on competitiveness, trade and thus in the net foreign
asset/debt position of the economy. Since foreign prices developments are assumed to be
independent of domestic shocks, the real exchange rate pins down uniquely the domestic
price level.
Finally, PESSOA features monopolistic competition and a number of nominal and real
rigidities that give rise to realistic short-run impacts and create room for stabilisation
policy. On the nominal side, dierentiation in the labour and product markets stemming
from monopolistic competition, allows for staggered wage and price ination. On the
real side, the model incorporates external habit formation in consumption and quadratic
adjustment costs on investment and import contents.
The model is populated by households, which will be presented in detail in subsection
3.1; unions, presented in subsection 3.2; and rms (intermediate goods producers and nal
goods producers), which will be presented in subsection 3.3. These agents interact with a
Government, which is described in subsection 3.4. The rest of the world, corresponding to
the rest of the monetary union, is presented in subsection 3.5, while the market clearing
conditions are presented in subsection 3.6. The model calibration is claried in subsection
3.7.
3.1 Households
Households evolve in line with the overlapping generations scheme rst proposed in Blan-
chard (1985). All households have stochastic nite lifetimes, facing an instant probability
of death 1  ( is the probability of surviving between two consecutive periods), which is
constant throughout life, independent of age and equal for all households.4 However, the
4The probability of an individual dying after t periods of life is equal to (1   )
t 1 and the expected
life horizon at any point in time is equal to (1   )
 1. Probability 1    can also be interpreted as a
probability of \economic death" or a degree of \myopia" (Blanchard 1985, Frenkel and Razin 1996, Harrison
et al. 2005, Bayoumi and Sgherri 2006). It represents the inverse of the average planning horizon of the
household, which is likely to be far more shorter than its biologic lifetime. Bayoumi and Sgherri (2006)
present econometric evidence for the US in this direction.
7overall size of the population is assumed to remain constant and equal to N households,
implying that in each period N(1 ) households die and the same number of households
is born. In addition, two types of households coexist: type A, the asset holders, who can
access asset markets and perform both intra and inter-temporal optimisation, smoothing
out their consumption over lifetime by trading assets; and type B, the hand-to-mouth
households that do not access asset markets and are, therefore, not allowed to engage in
inter-temporal optimisation, consuming all of their income in each and every period as
in Gal  et al. (2007). The share of type B households is assumed to be  , implying that
in each period there coexist N(1    ) households holding assets and N  hand-to-mouth
households.
A representative household of type H 2 fA;Bg with age a derives utility from con-
sumption, CH
a;t, and leisure, 1   LH
a;t, according to a CRRA utility function (with LH
a;t




















where Et is the expectation operator, 0    1 stands for the standard time discount
factor,  > 0 is the coecient of risk aversion and 0  H  1 is a distribution parameter.
HabH
t represents external habits, dened in per capita terms as

CA





v for type A and B households, respectively, with parameter 0  v  1
controlling for the degree of habit persistence.5
Households of type A save in both domestic and foreign government bonds, Ba;t and
B
a;t, which yield gross nominal interest rates it and i
t, respectively, from period t to period
t + 1 (by convention, interest is paid at the beginning of period t + 1). Domestic public
debt is assumed to be solely held by domestic agents (full home bias). Besides returns
from nancial assets, these households also receive labour income, earning a wage rate,
Wt, adjusted by the household's age-specic productivity level, a = ka, where k is a
scaling factor and 0    1 is the labour productivity rate of decay per period that
generates a life-cycle income prole. Furthermore, they receive dividends from rms and
from labour unions (the later reect a wage premia that will be motivated later on). These
are represented by DA
a;t(x) where x can be: the intermediate goods producers of tradable
(T ) and non-tradable goods (N); the nal goods producers of private consumption (C),
government consumption (G), capital (I), or export goods (X); or labour unions (U). Fi-
nally, households are taxed by the Government in their consumption and labour activities




The asset holders' optimisation problem consists in setting the path of consumption,
labour, domestic and foreign asset holdings, that maximises (1) subject to the following
5Aggregation across generations is made possible by assuming that habits are multiplicative instead of
additive. However, it should be recognised that this generates a low habit persistence.
8budget constraint:
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where Pt = (1+C;t)PC
t , the after-tax price of the nal consumption good, is the numeraire
price of the economy and PC
t is the before-tax price of the nal consumption good.
Type A households are not indierent between government expenditure nancing with
tax levies or debt issuance (which corresponds to future taxes). They strongly prefer debt
issuance and take part of government bond holdings as net wealth. This non-Ricardian
feature results essentially from nite lifetime and is amplied by the life-cycle income pro-
le due to declining lifetime productivity. The intuition is that if government expenditure
is nanced with debt issuance, households will hold a share of this debt that exceeds the
present discounted value of future tax liabilities, since future taxes will also be levied on
yet-to-be born generations. Hence, part of the debt held by households is net wealth in
the sense that it can be used to nance private consumption expenditures during life-
time, instead of being used to face future tax payments. These eects are magnied by
the fact that the labour income tax represents an important part of overall tax revenue.
The life-cycle income prole implies that labour productivity and wage income decline
throughout lifetime and, therefore, farther apart in time taxes are levied the lower the
labour income tax payments. The combination of stochastic nite lifetimes and life-cycle
income prole implies that households tend to be more short-term oriented, than in the
standard innitely lived agents framework.
For type B households, the lack of access to assets/debt market implies that the inter-
temporal optimisation problem collapses to an intra-temporal optimisation problem (due
to the impossibility of shifting consumption across periods by trading in assets). These
households merely choose consumption and labour that maximise their instant utility
introducing an additional layer of non-Ricardian behavior that is crucial to obtain realistic
short-run responses of consumption to scal stimulus (Gal  et al. 2007). Therefore, shocks
occurring in a given period are totally reected in the budget constraint of that period
and create powerful income eects.








where all variables have the interpretation previously dened for asset holders.
The households utility maximisation problem delivers a condition for each type of
household that yields their optimal consumption-leisure allocation, the consumption func-
9tion, which depends on wealth in the case of asset holders and on per-period income in the
case of hand-to-mouth households, and a degenerated interest rate parity condition. The
consumption function expresses consumption as a function of human and nancial wealth.
Human wealth corresponds to the expected present discounted value of labour supply en-
dowments and dividend income, while nancial wealth is composed by the households'
current domestic and foreign asset holdings. The interest rate parity condition denes
the equilibrium in the bonds market and essentially implies that domestic interest rates
depart from foreign interest rates by an exogenous risk premium, 	 (in short, it = i
t	).
3.2 Unions
There is a continuum of labour unions in the economy, indexed by h 2 [0;1], who buy
the homogeneous labour from households and transform it into dierent varieties, Ut(h).
The labour dierentiation scheme gives market power to each union over its respective
variety, allowing it to charge manufacturers a wage, Vt(h), higher than the one paid to
households. The dierent varieties are then combined to produce a labour bundle, Ut(j),
sold to manufacturer j at an aggregate wage, Vt, higher than Wt. This wedge reects
the fact that manufacturers pay a higher price for Ut(j), as it incorporates dierentiated
labour inputs, contrary to the labour supplied by households.
Each manufacturer demands a certain quantity of all varieties of labour to be included








where 0  U;t  1 is the elasticity of substitution across dierent varieties of labour,
which determines the degree of union h market power, i.e., the markup charged over the
wage paid to households in the steady state.
The wage-setting process is costly, with abrupt union wage (Vt(h)) changes being more
costly than smooth wage adjustments. This is implemented by assuming that labour
unions incur in wage adjustment costs,  U
t (h). In the spirit of Ireland (2001) and Laxton












where U is the adjustment cost parameter and Tt is the level of the labour-augmenting
technical progress, which enters as a scaling factor, ensuring that adjustment costs do not
vanish along the balanced growth path.












rt+l 1 for s > 0
(1 for s = 0) stands for the subjective real discount factor and rt = it
e
t+1 is the real interest
rate, with e
t+1 being the numeraire good expected ination rate. Period t dividends,
DU
t (h), are dened as:
DU
t (h) = (1   L;t)





It should be noted that usually households directly provide the dierentiated services
and explore the corresponding market power in New-Keynesian general equilibrium mod-
els, while wages are subject to a staggered adjustment process  a la Calvo in line with
Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), in many cases with indexation, as in Smets and
Wouters (2007) and Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde (2005). This is not the
case in the model used herein. Such option creates heterogenous labour and wages across
households that can jeopardise aggregation in a model with an overlapping generations
environment and a life-cycle income prole (since it increases the degree of wage hetero-
geneity across cohorts already in place due to the life-cyle income prole). Therefore,
to keep the model tractable, the dierentiated wage-setting problem is performed by the
union, as in Fagan, Gaspar and Pereira (2004) and Kumhof et al. (2010), while wage
stickiness is modelled as in (5).
3.3 Firms
The production block of the model features two types of rms: manufacturers, who pro-
duce intermediate goods, and distributors, who produce nal goods. Manufacturers com-
bine labour and capital to produce dierent varieties of tradable (T ) and non-tradable
(N) intermediate goods. Labour is purchased from unions, while capital results from the
accumulation of new capital goods (investment) purchased from the respective distribu-
tor. The intermediate goods are sold to distributors, who combine them with imports to
produce dierentiated nal good varieties. There are four types of nal goods: consumer
goods (C); new capital goods (I); Government consumption goods (G) and export goods
(X), which dier in its content of tradable, non-tradable and imported goods.
Manufacturers
For each type of intermediate good J 2 fT ;Ng there is a continuum of manufacturing
rms j 2 [0;1]. Each rm produces a variety of the good, ZJ
t (j), using capital, KJ
t (j), and
labour, UJ
t (j), as inputs. The rm sells the good at price PJ
t (j), higher than the marginal
cost, reecting the market power yielded by product dierentiation.

























where 0  ZJ  1 is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in sec-
tor J; 0  J
U  1 is the quasi-labour income share; AJ
t is a stationary sector-specic
technology shock; and Tt is a labour-augmenting technical progress, assumed to evolve
deterministically at a constant exogenous rate g, such that Tt=Tt 1 = g.
To accumulate capital, manufacturers invest, IJ
t (j), subject to a standard capital ac-
cumulation condition:
KJ
t+1(j) = (1   J)KJ
t (j) + IJ
t (j) (9)
where 0  J  1 is a sector-specic constant depreciation rate.
In order to obtain a smooth response of production factor quantities to changes in
their desired level, investment and labour are subject to quadratic real adjustment costs,
 IJ
t (j) and  UJ





























where IJ and UJ determine the cost of changing the investment rate and the labour
intensity for rms in sector J; and IJ
t and UJ
t are aggregate investment and labour,
respectively.
Furthermore, in order to obtain a realistic short-run behaviour of intermediate goods
price ination, quadratic adjustment costs,  PJ


















where PJ determines how costly is to adjust prices for rms operating in sector J; ZJ
t is
the aggregate output of sector J, which is sold to distributors at the price PJ
t .
Each distributor sets the demand of each variety of type J intermediate good, by solv-
ing a standard cost minimisation problem. Aggregating across distributors, the demand











12where 0  J;t  1 is the elasticity of substitution between type J good varieties.












subject to the constraints imposed by the production technology, capital accumulation
condition, adjustment costs and demand conditions. Period t dividends, DJ
t (j), are dened
as:
DJ











t (j) + PI
t IJ
t (j) + PI
t  IJ
t (j) + Vt UJ
t (j) + PJ
t  PJ




t (j) corresponding to overall revenue, (1 + SP;t)VtUJ
t (j) being labour costs
inclusive of employer's social security contributions (SP;t is motivated below in subsection
3.4), and PI
t IJ
t (j) standing for investment spending, where PI
t is the price of new capital
goods. The term PI
t  IJ
t (j) + Vt UJ
t (j) + PJ
t  PJ
t (j) includes costs related with price
adjustments and with changes in the quantities of labour and capital used. Finally, a real
xed cost term, !J, scaled by the technological progress and by the output price level,
PJ
t Tt!J, is used to ensure that economic prots arising from monopolistic competition are
largely depleted in the steady state and, therefore, there are no rms entering or leaving
the market.6
A dividend income tax, K;t, is charged on Net operational prot, which diers from
Operational cashow by the fact that capital depreciation is tax rebatable, but investment






t (j) + PI
t qJ
t JKJ
t (j) + PI
t  IJ
t (j) + Vt UJ
t (j) + PJ
t  PJ
t (j) + PJ
t Tt!J
where qJ
t is Tobin's-Q, the shadow price of a unit of installed capital in terms of new
capital goods.
Distributors
For each type of nal good F 2 fC;G;I;Xg there is a continuum of distributors f 2 [0;1].
Each type of nal good is demanded by a unique type of costumer: consumer goods (C) are
demanded by households, new capital goods (I) are demanded by manufacturing rms,
government consumption goods (G) are demanded by the Government, and export goods
(X) are demanded by foreign costumers. Distributors sell their goods at price PF
t (f),
which incorporates a markup over the marginal costs.
6The xed cost term is dened as a constant share of nominal output, ensuring that it does not vanish
along the inationary balanced growth path of the economy.
13Each distributor uses a two-stage production technology. In the rst stage, the distrib-
utor combines domestic tradable goods, ZT F
t (f), with imported goods, MF
t (f), to obtain
Y AF
t (f), which is an assembled good of variety f; in the second stage, the distributor
combines the assembled good with domestic non-tradable goods, ZNF
t (f), to produce the
variety f of the nal good, Y F
t (f), which is then sold to its costumers. The production
technology is formalised as a sector-specic nested CES production function.


























where 0  AF  1 is the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and the imported
tradable goods; 0  AF  1 is a home bias parameter; and  AF
t (f) stands for a real
adjustment cost on changes in the import content, MF
t (f)=Y AF






















where AF is a sector-specic adjustment cost parameter; MF
t and Y AF
t represent aggre-
gate imports and assembled goods, respectively.























where 0  F  1 is the elasticity of substitution between assembled and non-tradable
goods, and 0  F  1 is the non-tradable goods bias parameter.
As in the case of labour unions and manufacturers, distributors face quadratic costs
in the adjustment of the nal good price,  PF

















where PF is the sector-specic price adjustment cost parameter; Y F
t is the aggregate
output of nal good F, to be sold at price PF
t .











where 0  F;t  1 is the elasticity of substitution between type F good varieties.












subject to the constraints imposed by the production technology, adjustment costs and
demand conditions. Period t dividends, DF
t (j), are dened as:
DF




t (f)   PT
t ZT F
t (f)   PN
t ZNF
t (f)   P
t MF
t (f)   PF
t  PF
t (f)   PF
t Tt!F
corresponding to the after-tax overall revenue PF
t (f)Y F
t (f) deducted of expenditure, in-






t (f), and adjustment and xed costs,
PF
t (f) PF
t (f) + PF
t (f)Tt!F. Finally, P
t is the price of imported goods, MF
t (f), set by
foreign exporters.
3.4 The Government
The scal block of the model is detailed enough to allow for the assessment of macroe-
conomic impacts of alternative scal policy strategies. The Government has a number of
scal instruments that can be used to stabilise the business cycle, though with dierent
macroeconomic impacts. Government nances expenditure through tax levies that need
not to coincide with expenditure in time, since Government manages a public debt stock.
The disaggregation considered for the public sector account is illustrated in Table 1.
On the expenditure side, the government buys a specic nal good, PG
t Gt (recall
that PG
t is the price charged by distributors for the government consumption good) and
performs lump-sum transfers to households, TRGt. In addition, Government pays debt
interest outlays, (it 1   1)Bt 1 (where Bt 1 are one-period bonds which pay an interest
rate it 1 at the beginning of period t).






and on households' consumption, RVC;t = C;tPC
t Ct. In addition, Gov-
ernment charges social security contributions on rms' payroll, RVSP;t = SPVtUt, and
corporate income taxes due on operational prots by both manufacturers and distribu-









































Finally, it is considered the possibility of Government expenditures being partly funded
through transfers from the rest of the monetary union, TREt.
It should be noted that the Government nances its expenditure mostly through dis-
tortionary taxation. In particular, taxation on labour income and/or higher social security
contributions rate induce households to substitute consumption for leisure and/or manu-
facturers to use technologies with higher capital intensity. In addition, the consumption
15tax rate also induces households to substitute away from consumption.
As previously mentioned, the Government issues one-period bonds, paying interest
outlays at the beginning of period t on the stock held from period t   1. For the sake
of simplicity, full home bias is assumed, i.e. all government debt is held by domestic
households. However, since type A households can access international debt markets and
borrow abroad to buy the bonds at a rate identical to Government this assumption is
neutral.
The issuance of public debt allows for the postponement of charging the taxes required
to nance expenditure in each period, implying that the public sector account does not
need to balance out in each and every period. This has a non-trivial impact in households
decisions, since the model is inherently non-Ricardian and, therefore, part of the public
debt is taken as net wealth by asset holders.
Government's budget constraint can be represented as:
Bt = it 1Bt 1 + PG
t Gt + TRGt   RVt   TREt (21)
where RVt =
P
A=C;L;SP;K RVA;t are overall revenues.
To ensure that public debt follows a non-explosive path, a scal policy rule is fea-
tured, imposing that public debt and the scal balance (henceforth SGt = Bt 1   Bt)









t , which is a key
steady-state gure. For each period, the scal rule sets the scal balance that is consistent
with a stable debt path, imposing that the budget constraint is binding and at least one
of the scal instruments adjust endogenously to full it. In line with Kumhof and Laxton

































t is the structural overall tax revenue (i.e. the tax revenue that would have
been gathered in case tax bases stood at their steady-state levels); GDPt and GDPss
t
are the observed and the steady-state levels of Gross Domestic Product. The speed of
convergence and the response to business cycle uctuations depend on parameters d1 and
Table 1: Simplied public sector account
Expenditures Revenues
Govt. Consumption PG
t Gt Consumption tax RVC;t
Transfers TRGt Soc. Sec. Contributions RVSP;t
Interest Payments (it 1   1)Bt 1 Labour income tax RVL;t
Corporate income tax RVK;t
Foreign transfers TREt
Fiscal balance  (Bt   Bt 1)
16d2. Parameter d1 controls for the response to the tax revenue gap, while d2 controls for the
Government (in)tolerance to deviations of debt from the target ratio. Since revenue and
debt gaps vanish in the steady state, the rule implies a convergence of the scal balance
to its target level.
At this point, the scal instrument that becomes endogenous remains to be dened.
This is an open scal policy decision and is largely a political matter. Ex-ante, the gov-
ernment has the following scal instruments: Government consumption (Gt), lump-sum
transfers to households (TRGt) (which can be targeted at rule-of-thumb households or
uniformly distributed across all households), the labour income tax rate (L;t), the con-
sumption tax rate (C;t), the employer's social security contributions rate (SP) and the
corporate income tax rate (K;t)7. However, ex-post one of these instruments is endoge-
nously adjusted to meet the scal balance imposed by the scal rule.8 The most common
option relies on the use of the labour income tax rate as the endogenous scal policy
instrument (Kilponen and Ripatti 2005, Kumhof et al. 2010, Kumhof and Laxton 2007).
The benchmark specication of PESSOA also takes this option, but it allows for other
possibilities, including not only the remaining taxes, but also transfers to households or
Government consumption. In addition, it is also possible to consider alternative combina-
tions of instruments.
Finally, a word of caution is needed. Although the above-mentioned scal block is
suited to implement several scal simulations, the model remains a simplication of reality.
In particular, Government consumption does not aect the marginal utility of consump-
tion and leisure or the rms' productivity level. Therefore, the only tangible impact of
Government consumption is changing demand conditions for a specic type of nal good,
which is particulary intensive in non-tradable intermediate goods and has a negligible
import content. The model is thus silent to other roles of the Government, for instance
as employer or investor. As Hall (2009) claries, it is not the case that eects operating
through externalities are unimportant, but simply that the scal stimulus has to be un-
dertaken as an experiment on a limited and controlled macroeconomic environment. It
is beyond the scope of this paper to dene externalities' eects conditional on dierent
scal policies. Note also that the model does not feature unemployment benets explicitly,
since labour market details are reduced to the minimum and, therefore, unemployment
developments are not explicitly modeled.
3.5 The rest of the world
By assumption, the rest of the world (RoW) corresponds to the rest of the euro area, and
therefore the nominal eective exchange rate is irrevocably set to unity.
Regarding nancial ows, it is assumed that changes in the net foreign asset/debt
7The distinction between Government consumption and investment is not considered in the model.
8In many studies, the budget constraint is simplied to include a non-distortionary lump-sum tax.
Though it may be an appealing academic benchmark, it is largely unrealistic since the role played by
lump-sum taxation is very limited.
17position of the domestic economy have no impact on foreign macroeconomic aggregates
and therefore on monetary policy decisions. As for trade ows, the demand for imports by
domestic distributors results from the dividend maximisation problem presented in section
3.3 and reects demand conditions and competitiveness. Concerning exports, let Y A
t (f)
be the good demanded by a continuum f 2 [0;1] of importers located abroad. This
good is assumed to result from the assembling of a domestic exported good Xt(f) and an
intermediate tradable good ZT
t (f) produced by foreign manufacturers. The production


















where  is the elasticity of substitution between foreign tradable goods and home exports
and  is the foreign economy bias parameter.
Each foreign distributor will set the demand for the export good produced in the
SOE and for the tradable goods produced in foreign economy that minimises the cost of
producing the desired quantity of nal good, subject to the technology constraint imposed












t is the price of the exported good charged by domestic distributors, PT
t is
the price of the foreign tradable good and Y A
t is aggregate production of the foreign
assembled good. It should be noted that this equation is fundamental to render the
model dynamically stable, namely due to a large elasticity of exports to real exchange rate
movements. The model operates de facto like a real model (or a xed nominal exchange
rate model under perfect credibility), since domestic price levels are pinned down by the
external constraint that uniquely sets the real exchange rate in the steady state. Like the
remaining foreign variables, both PT
t and Y A
t are assumed to be independent of domestic
developments.
Finally, some comments should be made concerning the external environment of PES-
SOA. Firstly, though restricting the RoW to the rest of the monetary union may be a
limiting assumption, it does not seem to be very stringent for scal policy analysis and al-
lows for a more parsimonious external block. More specically, under this assumption one
does not need to explicitly model interactions between the euro area and the world exclud-
ing the euro area. Obviously, this breakdown becomes clearly relevant in case one wants
to assess the impact on the domestic economy of shocks originated abroad, in particular if
a large share of external trade in goods and assets is done with countries outside the euro
area. Secondly, while a country's exports in a multi-country framework are endogenously
determined by imports demand of the trading partners, in a SOE model foreign economy
18developments inuence the domestic economy signicantly, but are not inuenced by it
(Adolfson et al. 2007). Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that foreign demand
and prices are exogenous, with endogenous movements in exports being driven by real
exchange rate uctuations.
3.6 Market clearing conditions and GDP denitions
The model relies on a set of equilibrium conditions, which ensure that all markets clear in
each and every period.







In the intermediate goods market, the output produced by each type of manufacturer
must meet demand by distributors and cover price adjustment and xed costs:
ZT
t = ZT C
t + ZT I
t + ZT G
t + ZT X
t +  PT







t + Tt!N (27)
In the nal goods market, the output supplied by each type of distributor must meet









t +  T I
t +  NI
t +  PI
t + Tt!I (29)
Y G
t = Gt +  PG
t + Tt!G (30)
Y X
t = Xt +  PX
t + Tt!X (31)






t Xt   P
t Mt + TREt (32)
Finally, nominal GDP is dened as:
GDPt = PtCt + PG
t Gt + PI
t It + PX
t Xt   P
t Mt (33)
while real GDP is dened as nominal GDP evaluated at the price levels prevailing in the
initial steady state.9
9This mimics the national accounts denition of GDP at reference year prices.
193.7 Calibration
PESSOA was calibrated using actual data of the Portuguese economy and information
from several studies on the Portuguese and euro area economies, including DSGE models.
The model parameters are presented in detail in Appendix A.
The data on the Portuguese economy was mainly taken from the Banco de Portugal
quarterly database (included in the 2009 Summer issue of the Economic Bulletin), and
from the National Accounts data released by Statistics Portugal. These data sources were
primarily used to pin down those parameters aecting the steady-state key macroeconomic
ratios. As reported in Appendix A, the model matches fairly reasonably the key ratios of
the Portuguese economy and delivers a plausible capital-to-output ratio.
Among the relatively large set of parameters and assumptions behind the model, it
seems worth mentioning that the steady-state real GDP growth was assumed to be iden-
tical in the entire monetary union, which ensures the existence of a balanced growth path.
The annual growth rate of the labour-augmenting productivity was set to 2%, which is
consistent with the available estimates for the potential output growth in the euro area
(Musso and Westermann 2005, Proietti and Musso 2007). This gure also seemed plausible
for Portugal (Almeida and F elix 2006). Regarding ination, the ECB ination objective
was assumed to be fully credible. Hence, the steady-state was solved under the assump-
tion that foreign ination stands at 2% per year. The euro area nominal interest rate in
the steady state was set to 4.5% (Coenen, McAdam and Straub 2007). The parameters
related with the Blanchard-Yaari households behaviour, namely the instant probability of
death and the decay in productivity over the lifetime were calibrated as in Kumhof et al.
(2010). The elasticities of substitution in the production functions of manufacturers and
distributors, the parameters governing the wage and price markups, the adjustment costs,
and the scal rule parameters were calibrated using Kumhof et al. (2010), Coenen et al.
(2007) and estimates for Portugal, whenever they were available.
4 Macroeconomic eects of scal consolidation
This section assesses the macroeconomic eects of scal consolidation in a small euro area
economy. Fiscal consolidation is dened as a permanent reduction in the public debt ratio
and is implemented through a gradual scal tightening, followed by a stabilisation around
the new steady-state level. Over time debt falls and so does Government interest outlays,
which allows for a larger primary decit in the new steady-state.
The analysis presented in this section is conducted by implementing a set of scal policy
simulations using the model described in section 3, to study the costs and benets of scal
consolidation. We analyse the eects of two alternative scal consolidation scenarios: a
pure scal consolidation and a scal consolidation accompanied by a tax reform. Those
scenarios are based on a very specic set of policy measures, which were selected partly
on the basis of their macroeconomic impacts. Therefore, before discussing those scenarios,
20subsection 4.1 presents four simulations in which the impact of each available scal policy
instrument on the main macroeconomic variables is analysed in isolation to illustrate the
main transmission channels.
Subsection 4.2 studies the transitional dynamic, the steady-state and the welfare im-
pacts of a pure scal consolidation programme and of a scal consolidation programme
accompanied by a tax reform. The rst scenario is focused on the potential benets and
costs of a scal consolidation, while in the second scenario it is examined whether costs
can be minimised and benets can be enhanced by a change in the policy mix.
In subsection 4.3 the pure scal consolidation scenario is expanded to implement a
sensitivity analysis focused on the duration of the consolidation process. More speci-
cally, we considerer two alternative scenarios. The rst one concerns the possibility of a
protracted consolidation period (the \slow consolidation scenario"), which is characterized
by a less aggressive policy towards reaching the target debt-to-GDP ratio. The second one
considers a shorter consolidation period (the \fast consolidation scenario") with a more
aggressive policy towards reaching the target debt-to-GDP ratio.
In the above-mentioned scenarios it is assumed that the risk premium on Government
debt is not aected by the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio. However, particularly in the
current juncture, characterized by high risk premium on sovereign debt of some euro area
economies and a low risk tolerance among investors, the assumption of an unchanged risk
premium does not seem very realistic. Hence, subsection 4.4 considers a baseline where
the risk premium in the small euro area economy is positive, reecting the elevated public
debt ratio, and an alternative exercise is conducted, adding to the pure scal consolidation
strategy a permanent reduction in the country risk premium as consolidation takes place.
The sensitivity of results to alternative paths for the risk premium on sovereign debt is
also addressed.
Throughout this section, the scal consolidation experiments are all based on a per-
manent reduction in public decit of 1 percent of initial steady-state GDP. Given the
assumptions of the model for nominal interest rates and nominal GDP growth, around
4.5 and 4 per cent respectively, a permanent reduction in public decit of 1 p.p. of initial
steady-state GDP corresponds to a decline in Government debt-to-GDP ratio of around
25 p.p. in the long-run. However, given the extremely long-lived dynamics of scal con-
solidation, changes in ows take literally decades to be fully reected in the corresponding
public debt stock. Thus, in the following subsections impulse response functions are shown
by lines for the rst 10 years and by points representing outcomes as from year 20 onwards.
4.1 Impact of alternative instruments
Figure 2 presents the results of 4 alternative scal consolidation instruments, with one
scal instrument being used at a time (transfers to households, Government consumption,
\tax burden on wage income"10 or consumption tax) to reach a reduction on the scal
10\Tax burden on wage income" corresponds to the labour income tax rate paid by employees and
employers' social security contributions, which are adjusted in equal magnitudes in terms of percentage
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Note: Ination, NFA and Public debt deviations are in percentage points. The remaining
variables are in percentage. Higher real exchange rate implies depreciation.
decit equal to 1 per cent of initial steady-state GDP. In each simulation, the remaining
tax rates or spending components are held constant.
Starting with scal consolidation based on expenditure cuts, it aects macroeconomic
point changes in their average tax rates.
22outcomes mainly through their impact on households' wealth and on the resulting re-
sponses of labour supply and private consumption.11 A reduction in transfers has a sig-
nicant negative wealth eect, leading to a drop in consumption and leisure and thus to
an increase in labour supply.12 Rule-of-thumb households strongly cut their consumption
and simultaneously increase hours worked to compensate foregone income. Consumption
of asset holders is less aected, reecting expected dividend prospects and the possibility
of consumption smoothing. Moreover, the shift in labour supply leads to lower real wages
and to a decrease in the rm's' marginal costs implying a drop in domestic prices and a
real exchange rate depreciation.
A decrease in the demand for Government consumption goods, which are labour in-
tensive, implies a reduction in labour demand. As a consequence, real wages decline and
so households' wealth and private consumption. In this simulation, unlike what happens
in the transfers cuts, the impact in labour supply and consumption is similar for both
types of households. Moreover, Government consumption goods production employs re-
sources that would otherwise be available to produce other types of goods and so a cut
in Government consumption reduces demand side pressures and contributes to a decrease
in domestic prices and thus to international competitiveness gains, through real exchange
rate depreciation.
Expenditure-based consolidation policies that reduce the demand pressures, promotes a
real exchange rate depreciation and benets the international competitiveness of domestic
rms. This stimulates domestic production and factor demand and improves external
imbalance, partly osetting the recessionary impacts of scal consolidation. On the other
hand, the fall in ination raises the real interest rate, exacerbating the decline in aggregate
demand and amplifying the short-run contractionary eect of scal consolidation.13
In turn, scal consolidation based on tax increases implies a protracted decline in out-
put, private consumption and investment to below steady-state levels. Concerning \tax
burden on wage income" it should be noted that it includes the labour income tax rate
paid by employees and the employers' social security contributions. An increase in the
labour income tax aects the economy mainly through their impact on the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and leisure. Hence, a rise in labour income tax dis-
courages work eort, implying a decrease in labour supply. At the same time, an increase
in employers' social security contributions leads to an increase in the marginal costs of
rms and thus rms substitute labour for capital, reducing labour demand. Therefore,
a rise in \tax burden on wage income" implies a decrease in hours worked and an in-
crease in domestic prices, which implies a real exchange rate appreciation and a loss in
competitiveness.
11For a detailed analysis on the impact of alternative scal instruments on the main macroeconomic
variables and the implied transmission mechanisms see Almeida, Castro, F elix and Maria (2010).
12The underlying assumption behind the eect on labour supply is that all households act as labour
suppliers, and therefore a cut in transfers induce a shift in labour supply. In practice, a part of the
transfers are received by disability or old-age pensioners, which do not actively supply labour.
13In models with endogenous nominal interest rate, the contractionary short-term impact of scal con-
solidation is partly compensated by the monetary policy reaction, if the zero lower bound is not binding.
23Regarding consumption tax, it is far less distortionary of the consumption/leisure al-
location than \tax burden on wage income". Changes in consumption tax aects the
economy mainly through the price transmission channel, reducing the real value of house-
holds wealth. This induces households to supply more labour in order to cushion the
impact of the negative wealth eect on consumption, explaining the smaller decline in
hours worked than in the case of the \tax burden on wage income".
Accordingly, \tax burden on wage income" is likely to be the instrument that involves
higher short and medium term losses in terms of GDP, consumption and investment when
used to perform scal consolidation. Consolidation strategies based on transfers and Gov-
ernment consumption cuts are the less penalising for real GDP, private consumption and
investment. These results suggests that expenditure cuts tends to dominante tax increases
in a scal consolidation strategy (Giancarlo Corsetti and M uller 2010), which could be par-
ticular true in the case of some European economies where taxes are high and where the
recent period has been characterized by a huge rise in public expenditures. However, ex-
penditure cuts are also likely to imply some reforms that take time to implement and so,
in the short-run, taxes may help to speed up scal consolidation.
Therefore, we choose a scal consolidation strategy mainly based on expenditure cuts
(Government consumption and transfers to households), but where \tax burden on wage
income" adjusts endogenously, increasing slightly in the short-run in order to reach the
lower target level for Government decit more quickly (henceforth the pure consolidation
scenario).
4.2 Two scal consolidation strategies
This subsection analises the impact on the main macroeconomic variables of two alter-
native scal consolidation scenarios that are based on specic scal instruments. The
exercise is conducted assuming perfect foresight and full credibility of the scal authority
and therefore the risk premium on Government debt is not aected by the consolidation
strategy chosen. However, it should be highlighted that this assumption looks too strong
at the current juncture and thus results should be interpreted with caution. In fact, if
an economy is facing high market pressures and a rise in the risk premium, a credible
scal consolidation may reduce it, implying lower borrowing rates and therefore smaller
short-run costs of scal consolidation (see subsection 4.4).
The rst scenario considers a pure scal consolidation strategy and corresponds to a
permanent reduction in public decit of 1 percent of initial steady-state GDP. The reduc-
tion in the decit is mainly achieved through spending cuts, which are the least penalising
scal instruments for economic activity. More specically, it is considered a permanent cut
in Government consumption and in transfers to households, each one contributing 0.5 per
cent of initial steady-state GDP for the tightening. These scal measures are assumed to
be gradually factored in over a period of four years. In the short-run, the adjustment to a
lower decit level implies that \tax burden on wage income" increases slightly (see Figure
24Figure 3: Fiscal consolidation scenarios - evolution of tax rates





























3). However, as Government debt falls, interest payments will decline and the resulting
savings may be used to nance either new tax cuts or spending increases. We assumed
that the savings are used to reduce \tax burden on wage income" over the medium and
the long-run, since this instrument is the most distortionary and, therefore, a cut in \tax
burden on wage income" enhances the impact on economic growth and welfare (this issue
will be discussed below).
The second scenario regards a scal consolidation with a tax reform. Labour taxes
or consumption taxes aect dierently savings and labour supply decisions. It is often
claimed that shifts towards taxes on consumption stimulate private saving, enhance eco-
nomic growth and promote job creation. Moreover, it is also argued that the substitution
of labour taxes for consumption taxes, for example the VAT, which is levied on nal con-
sumption and not on investment or exports, is a competitiveness-enhancing tool and can be
seen as a devaluation of the domestic currency, but without the inationary pass-through
to domestic prices.
In this context, the scenario of scal consolidation with tax reform preserves the as-
sumptions described previously, but adds a shift in the tax burden away from wage income
towards consumption tax. In this scenario, it is assumed that the average consumption
tax rate increases by 4 p.p.. \Tax burden on wage income" adjust endogenously as in the
previous exercise, but given the additional revenue generated by the consumption tax it
increases by less in the short run and falls more substantially in the long run. Hence, in
the case of the simulation without tax reform \tax burden on wage income" remains above
the baseline level during the rst 10 years and then start to decline, whereas in the case
of tax reform it only remains above the baseline level during the rst 3 years (see Figure
3).
Figure 4 shows the short and long term impact in the main macroeconomic variables
of the two scal consolidation scenarios. Regarding the short-tem, the pure consolidation
scenario points to a fall in GDP, which reaches a trough in the second year, around 2.1 per
cent below the baseline and starts to recover gradually thereafter. This scenario leads to a
protracted period of below-steady-state real GDP, almost 10 years. Private consumption
25strongly decreases in the rst years, due not only to the direct impact of scal measures
on wealth, but also to its impact on the real interest rate, which increases the return on
savings, measured in terms of future consumption, and implies a further disincentive to
present consumption. The negative impact on consumption and investment is slightly
counterbalanced in the short-run by the anticipation of more favourable future wealth and
dividends prospects due to expected lower distortionary taxes. On the other hand, the
decrease in the price level leads to a gain in international competitiveness, which implies
an increase in exports market share and a decline in the import content. Thus, in the
short-run, scal consolidation leads to an improvement in the trade balance-to-GDP ratio.
In the case of a scal consolidation accompanied by a tax reform, it is assumed a
permanent increase in the consumption tax, allowing a higher reduction of \tax burden
on wage income" in the new steady-state, which in a rational expectation framework is
anticipated by households. Hence, the tax reform reduces distortions in the economy,
promoting a higher labour utilisation and an increase in international competitiveness,
and therefore has a positive impact on GDP. Output decline is smaller in the short-run
than in the pure scal consolidation, reaching a trough in the rst year (around -1.6 per
cent) and starting to recover thereafter. The period of below-steady-state real GDP is
however substantially shortened, from 10 years in the rst scenario to 6 years.
Overall, we can conclude that a scal consolidation has unavoidable contractionary
short-run eects on economic activity, in particular in consumption and investment. At
the same time, an expansion in net exports usually occurs, partly osetting the negative
impact of domestic demand on GDP. Moreover, we can conclude that short-run costs can
be limited by changing the policy mix towards less distortionary taxation.
Regarding the long-run eects, Figure 4 also allows to shed some light on the question:
Does scal consolidation generate long-term benets?
Lower public debt reduces over the longer time horizon the burden of Government
interest payments, which in the simulations illustrated in Figure 4 is used to reduce the
\tax burden on wage income". In the case of a scal consolidation without tax reform, the
\tax burden on wage income" declines 3.3 p.p. in the new steady-state. Hence, households'
after-tax real wage increases, raising the opportunity cost of leisure and therefore leading
to an increase in households' labour supply. At the same time, labour costs of rms fall and
labour demand increases, leading to a rise in the marginal product of capital and fostering
capital accumulation. The increase in wealth, due to the increase in wage income and
capital accumulation, boosts consumption and investment and therefore real GDP. In the
long-run, real GDP is 2.5 per cent above the baseline.
In the case of a scal consolidation with tax reform the qualitative eects are quite
similar, but the magnitudes are magnied. The \tax burden on wage income" declines 5.8
p.p. in the new steady-state and the long-run impact on real GDP is 3.5 per cent above
the baseline, which is signicantly higher than the impact of a pure scal consolidation.
The decrease in public debt implies a decline in the net foreign liabilities-to-GDP ratio
of the small-open economy. Hence, the temporary trade balance improvement mentioned
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Note: For Ination, NFA and Public debt deviations are in percentage points. The remaining
variables are in percentage. Higher real exchange rate implies depreciation.
in the short-run analysis, mainly due to the real exchange rate depreciation, declines
gradually, resulting in a lasting trade decit nanced by lower burden of interest payments
on the domestic holdings of foreign debt in order to ensure that the net foreign liabilities
stabilize at a lower level.
Finally, the eects of scal consolidation can also be assessed by analysing the impact
on households' welfare. We consider a discrete time counterpart of the suggestion of Calvo
and Obstfeld (1988), which has also been used in Ganelli (2005) and Kumhof, Laxton and
27Table 2: Welfare assessment - compensating variation in consumption
(in percentage)
Discount rate 0.1% 2.8% 6.3% 30%
Average planing horizon of agents (years) 1000 36 16 3
Fiscal consolidation without tax reform 7.9 1.5 -3.4 -8.9
Fiscal consolidation with tax reform 10.4 3.5 -1.9 -8.2
Leigh (2008). Welfare analysis can be seen as a benchmark metric for the impact of
a particular policy experiment in households welfare, as measured through the aggregate
lifetime utility, which is a function of goods valued by households (consumption and leisure
in the case at hand). Hence, welfare corresponds to a weighted average of the utility of
the individuals alive in current and future periods, where a weighting factor W reects
the importance of future generations in the welfare from the viewpoint of the policymaker.
The welfare impact is synthesised in the standard compensated variation of consumption
measure proposed in Lucas Jr. (1987), which transforms utility into corresponding units
of consumption good in the steady-state.14 Table 2 presents the impact on households'
welfare measured by the compensated consumption variation from a scal consolidation
with and without tax reform. As the planing horizon increases the gains from consolidation
in terms of households' welfare also increase. In the pure consolidation scenario households'
welfare, in aggregate terms, varies from  7:5 per cent, if the planning horizon is very short,
to 14:2 per cent, in a long term planning horizon. That is, for a planning horizon of more
than 16 years there are welfare gains. In a scenario of scal consolidation with tax reform
the welfare losses are lower in the short-run and the long-run gains are enhanced.
As mentioned before, we have assumed that the scal room created by lower interest
rate payments on outstanding Government debt is used to lower \tax burden on wage
income". This assumption was selected on the basis of their macroeconomic impact,
as illustrated in Table 3. This table compares the long run impacts of a pure scal
consolidation if savings on the burden of interest payments are used to cut consumption
tax or to raise one of the spending components (Government consumption or transfers
to households) instead of using them to cut the \tax burden on wage income". The
results points to positive long-run impacts on economic activity from scal consolidation,
regardless of the strategy chosen, except in the case that the scal authority uses the
improvement in the scal position to raise transfers.15 The positive eects on output vary
from around 0.5 per cent (increase in Government consumption) to 2.5 per cent (cut in
\tax burden on wage income"). When scal authority uses savings on interest payments
to cut consumption tax, real GDP increases around 1.4 per cent. Thus, stronger positive
impacts on GDP and in all private expenditure came from using savings to cut \tax burden
14A brief description of the methodology used for the welfare analysis is presented in the Appendix B.
15This result is conditioned to the assumption that all households act as labour suppliers and therefore
a cut in transfers induce a shift in labour supply.
28Table 3: Long-term eects of a permanent reduction of 1 p.p. in Government decit
(deviation from steady-state in percentage)
Lower interest burden used to:
Reduce L Reduce C Raise G Raise TRG
GDP 2.5 1.4 0.5 -0.4
Private consumption 4.6 3.1 -0.2 0.8
Private investment 1.5 0.7 0.6 -0.3
Exports 1.7 1.1 0.4 0.2
Imports 2.1 1.0 0.4 -0.6
Hours 2.1 1.0 0.4 -0.6
Real wage rate 2.3 4.1 0.2 0.2
Real exchange rate 0.7 0.3 -0.2 -0.3
Compensating variation in consumption (in SS) 12.1 8.8 -1.6 3.7
Notes: All variables are measured in percent deviations from the steady-state levels. The \reduce L
scenario" corresponds to the one illustrated in Figure 4 without tax reform. Higher real exchange rate
corresponds to a depreciation. The real exchange rate is computed with the prices of export goods.
The scal instruments are \tax burden on wage income" (L); consumption tax (C); Government
consumption (G); transfers (TRG).
on wage income", which is in line with the standard view of relative distortionary features
of the dierent scal instruments. The same conclusion is achieved if we consider welfare
analysis (see last row of Table 3).
We can conclude that despite the short-run costs of scal consolidation, in the long-run
a lower Government debt-to-GDP ratio has positive impacts on economic activity, enhanc-
ing consumption, investment and exports, and increasing households' welfare. Moreover,
the change in the composition of scal balance, in particular reducing \tax burden on wage
income" and increasing consumption tax, is benecial not only to reduce the short-run
costs of scal consolidation but also to boost the long-run benets. In short, reductions
of scal distortions have sizeable expansionary eects on the economy and positive eects
on aggregate welfare.
Finally, it is worth recalling that the analysis presented in this section does not take
into account the probability that reduced Government debt will aect the foreign risk
premium on euro area interest rates.
4.3 Alternative timings for scal consolidation
In this subsection we illustrate the impact of alternative timings to complete the scal
consolidation. The scenarios dier in the time horizon in which the new target for the
debt-to-GDP ratio has been reached: the benchmark scenario, which corresponds to the
one illustrated in Figure 4 without tax reform, the \slow consolidation scenario" and the
\fast consolidation scenario". The time by which half of the reduction in the target debt
ratio is reached is 8 years, 19 years and 4 years, respectively. It is worth mentioning that,
similar to previous simulations, our analysis is conducted under the assumption of perfect
foresight, full credibility of the scal authority and unchanged sovereign risk premium.
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Note: Ination, NFA and Public debt deviations are in percentage points. The remaining
variables are in percentage. Higher real exchange rate implies depreciation. The Benchmark
scenario corresponds to the one illustrated in Figure 4 without tax reform.
The results are summarized in Figure 5.
A front-loading scal consolidation - the \fast consolidation scenario"- implies a deep
recession, with signicant losses in output, consumption, investment and hours worked in
the short term. On the other hand, a slow scal consolidation, with a longer duration
of the consolidation period, implies smaller output, consumption and investment losses
30Table 4: Welfare assessment - compensating variation in consumption
(in percentage)
Discount rate 0.1% 2.8% 6.3% 30%
Average planing horizon of agents (years) 1000 36 16 3
Alternative timings for scal consolidation:
Slow consolidation 7.2 1.4 -2.1 -3.9
Benchmark 7.9 1.5 -3.4 -8.9
Fast consolidation 7.9 0.7 -5.6 -14.8
Fiscal consolidation with decrease in the risk premium:

	 = 0.995 24.5 11.9 3.4 -5.6

	 = 0.98 29.8 19.1 10.5 -0.8

	 = 0.75 31.7 23.9 17.2 6.9
and a smaller reduction in hours worked in the short and medium term, but a more
protracted period of below steady-state GDP. Moreover, improvements in the international
competitiveness of domestic rms', which takes place in all scenarios, are more limited in
the case of a slow consolidation strategy.
The upper part of Table 4 presents the welfare costs and benets for the 3 scenarios.
Results show that for short-term horizons the slow consolidation scenario implies lower
welfare losses, and therefore current generations may prefer this scal policy strategy. As
the planning horizon increases, the dierence between the alternative scal consolidation
strategies in terms of costs and benets narrows and therefore a slow consolidation may
no longer be the optimal strategy for future generations.
The above results suggest that in general a credible slow scal adjustment implies
in the short-run lower output and welfare costs.16 However, it should be emphasized
that results are conditioned by the assumption of an unchanged risk premium. In the
current juncture, characterised by high risk premium on sovereign debt of some euro
area economies and a low risk tolerance among investors, this assumption does not seem
very realistic. Therefore, subsection 4.4 oers some evidence regarding the importance
of considering the likely impact of risk premium changes conditioned to the chosen scal
consolidation strategy.
4.4 Fiscal consolidation with a decrease in the risk premium
This subsection presents a simple exercise to illustrate the importance of considering the
role of the risk premium in the analysis of the costs and benets of scal consolidation.
The discussion of the impact of scal consolidation in a context of a small open economy
that faces a high risk premium is particularly relevant in the current juncture. However,
in PESSOA the risk premium is orthogonal to economic developments and do not reect
probabilities of default. In this context, an ad-hoc exercise was implemented to illustrate
the impact of a reduction in the risk premium as a credible scal consolidation is im-
16For a similar result see Coenen, Mohr and Straub (2008b).
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plemented. The baseline of the pure scal consolidation scenario was changed in order
to include a risk premium of 100 basis points in the small open economy. As the ob-
served debt-to-GDP ratio converges to a lower target level, the risk premium decreases
and reaches zero in the nal steady-state. The risk premium (	t) is modeled as a shock
that follows a rst-order auto-regressive process:
ln	t = (1   	)ln  	 + 	 ln	t 1 + e	
t (34)
Where 	 is the persistence parameter,  	 is the steady-state risk premium and e	
t
stands for time t iid zero mean innovation. Figure 6 presents 3 alternative trajectories for
the risk premium, which diers on the calibration of parameter 	.
Figure 7 shows the results of the pure scal consolidation scenario accompanied by a
reduction in the risk premium, considering the 3 above-mentioned trajectories. The results
point to a signicant impact of a decrease in the risk premium on domestic demand and
GDP developments. The decrease in the risk premium directly aects households and rms
decisions, stimulating both consumption and investment. On the one hand, it implies a
lower discount rate on future income, which increases net wealth and has a positive eect
on households consumption. On the other hand, the decrease in the domestic interest rate
and the higher demand prospects implies a higher desired capital stock level and thus has a
positive impact on private investment. Additionally, the decrease in Government interest
outlays implies a lower increase of the \tax burden on wage income" in the short-run and
a more substantial fall in the long run, which leads to positive wealth eects enhancing
the impact on economic growth.
The gains of scal consolidation in terms of households' welfare are enhanced and
the short-term costs are reduced if the consolidation is accompanied by a decrease in
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Note: Ination, NFA and Public debt deviations are in percentage points. The remaining
variables are in percentage. Higher real exchange rate implies depreciation.
the risk premium (see Table 4). In the case of a sharp decrease in the risk premium
(	=0.75), scal consolidation leads to gains in current generations' welfare even for very
short planning horizons.
Although the reduction in the risk premium is ad-hoc, it clearly shows the importance
of taking risk premium eects into account in the discussion of the gains and costs of scal
33consolidation. The results point to lower short-term costs and higher long-term benets if
the reduction in public debt is accompanied by a reduction in the risk premium, implying
that short-term costs of scal consolidation are smaller in economies that face higher
market pressures. Moreover, in a scenario of a sizeable immediate decrease in the risk
premium, the impact of the scal consolidation may be even positive in the short-run, both
in terms of GDP growth and households' welfare. This result is in line with the literature
that highlights that scal contractions can have expansionary eects in some situations,
namely if condence in a country's public nance is low and the scal consolidation is
pursued in a credible and consistent manner, fostering the sustainability of public nances
in the long term.
The above results suggest that the appropriate scal consolidation strategy may not
be identical for all economies. Sharp corrections are probably needed in countries that
already face high and increasing foreign risk premium. Mild correction are nevertheless
more desirable if the risk premium is in a more comfortable situation and is not largely
inuenced by scal developments. In the current juncture, it is particularly important to
dene an appropriate pace of scal consolidation, assessing very carefully the balance of
risks, to minimise the contractionary eects on aggregate demand, which would undermine
a stable macroeconomic environment for households and rms to restore condence, and
to avoid damaging credibility that would probably lead to upward pressures in the risk
premium.
5 Conclusions
In the present juncture, a credible scal consolidation strategy seems necessary in many
euro area countries to bring the public debt ratio to a declining and sustainable path.
Moreover, some economies have been facing a surge in sovereign debt spreads and are being
forced to take immediate and rapid measures to ensure the access of the public sector to the
sovereign debt markets. However, debt reduction is painful for slow-growing economies,
since it may imply output losses in the short-run. At the same time, lowering debt and
thus reducing interest rate payments on outstanding government debt will bring long run
benets. In this context, evaluating the costs and benets of scal consolidation and
creating the conditions for a successful consolidation process have become an important
policy issue. The present article contributes to the discussion of costs and benets of scal
consolidation in a small euro area economy.
This article analises the impact on the macroeconomic scenario and on households'
welfare of alternative scal consolidation strategies, using a dynamic general equilibrium
model with non-Ricardian features (PESSOA). Simulations show that scal consolidation,
in general, implies a trade-o between the short-run costs and the long-run benets. We
also conclude that consolidation strategies based on transfers to households and Gov-
ernment consumption cuts are the less penalising for real GDP, private consumption,
investment and welfare in the short-run. At the same time, long-term gains of scal con-
34solidation are enhanced if the scal room created by lower Government interest outlays on
outstanding debt is used to cut distortionary taxes, in particular, on labour. Therefore,
well-designed consolidation strategies could minimise the short-term costs and enhance
the long-run benets. Additionally, we show that gains can be boosted if the scal consol-
idation strategy involves a tax reform that shifts the tax burden away from labour services
towards the households consumption expenditures, in a decit-neutral way, encouraging
investment and labour supply and enhancing competitiveness by a real exchange rate
depreciation.
The results also suggest that a front-loading scal consolidation implies a deeper reces-
sion, with signicant short-term losses in output, consumption, investment, hours worked
and welfare, when compared with a protracted consolidation strategy. Thus, if possible, a
credible slow scal adjustment is in general more benecial for the economy, in line with
the optimality of tax smoothing. However, those results are conditioned by the assump-
tion of an unchanged risk premium and, therefore, do not take into account the likelihood
that domestic interest rates could be correlated with the debt level. In this case, the bal-
ance of short-run costs and long-run benets might be quite dierent. The results show
that if a scal consolidation strategy is pursued in a credible and consistent manner and
implies a decreases in the risk premium on domestic interest rates, the short-term costs
are reduced and, in extreme cases, the short-run impact may be expansionary. Therefore,
the appropriate scal consolidation strategy may not be identical across the economies.
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39Appendices
A Model calibration
This appendix reports in some detail the calibration of the model parameters reported in
Table 1. As reported in the main text, the model matches fairly reasonably the key ratios
of the Portuguese economy and delivers a plausible capital-to-output ratio by industry
standards, as depicted in Table 2.17
The calibration of households parameters took into consideration the fact that the
model features Blanchard-Yaari overlapping generations, instead of the innitely-lived
agents framework. These parameters were therefore largely based on Fagan et al. (2004),
Harrison et al. (2005) and Kumhof and Laxton (2007). A and B were calibrated so as to
ensure that the elasticity of labour supply to real wage is 0:5, a value commonly found in
the literature. Since the Blanchard-Yaari overlapping generations households framework
allows for an endogenous determination of the net foreign asset position, the discount
rate was calibrated to ensure a net foreign debt position of 60% of GDP in the steady
state. The coecient of relative risk aversion was set to calibrate the inter-temporal
elasticity of substitution to 0:2, which might seem a low gure in comparison with the
values typically used in innitely-lived agents models, but is in the range of the values
regularly used in models featuring Blanchard-Yaari households. The share of liquidity
constrained households was set to 40%, broadly in line with the estimates for Portugal
presented in Castro (2006).
Concerning the labour unions parameters, we considered a 25% steady-state wage
markup, which is at the upper limit of the values usually found in the literature. Note,
however, that since the labour market in Portugal is strongly regulated, one may argue that
the markup could be even higher than the gures usually found in the DSGE literature.
Nominal wage rigidity was calibrated to ensure that wages adjust to the new equilibrium
in 6 quarters, a value slightly above euro area estimates published in Coenen et al. (2007),
but still in the range usually found in the literature.
Turning to manufacturers, the depreciation rate was assumed to be identical across
rms and was calibrated to get the investment-to-GDP ratio in line with the National
Accounts data. As regards the production function, a standard Cobb-Douglas function
between capital and labour was assumed and the distribution parameters were calibrated
to match the labour income share in the National Accounts data. The steady-state price
markup of tradable and non-tradable goods was calibrated using OECD product mar-
ket regulation indicators and the correlation between tradable and non-tradable goods
markups and product market regulation indicators found in Hj, Jimenez, Maher, Nico-
letti and Wise (2007). In particular, the price markup of the non-tradable goods was
set to 20%, which is at the upper bound of the range of values commonly found in the
literature, but consistent with the evidence pointing to low competition in the Portuguese
17The Portuguese National Accounts do not include gures for the capital stock.
40Appendix - Table 1: Main parameters
Parameter Value
Monetary union parameters
Euro area interest rate (annualised) i
 1.05
Euro area labour-augmenting prod. growth (annualised) g 1.02
Euro area ination target (annualised) 
 1.02
Euro area EoS between domestic and imported goods 
 2.50
Households and Unions
Households discount rate (annualised)  0.97
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution
1
 0.20
Households instant probability of death (annualised) 1    0.04
Households habit persistence  0.70
Consumption share - Type A households A 0.74
Consumption share - Type B households B 0.66
Lifetime productivity decline rate (annualised) 1    0.04




Wage rigidity - Adjustment cost U 200
Manufacturers
Depreciation rate (annualised)  0.09
EoS between capital and labour J 0.99
Price markup - tradables
T
T  1 1.10
Price markup - non-tradables
N
N 1 1.20
Capital adjustment cost IJ 10
Labour adjustment cost UJ 5
Price adjustment cost PJ 200
Quasi labour income share - tradables T 0.56
Quasi labour income share - non-tradables N 0.60
Distributors
EoS domestic tradable/imported good AF 1.50
EoS assembled/non-tradable good F 0.50
Price markup (domestic distributors)
F




Import content adjustment cost AF 2
Price adjustment cost PF 200
Government
Labour income tax rate L 0.23
Consumption tax rate C 0.31
Capital income tax rate K 0.17
Employers' social security contribution rate SP 0.19
Debt to GDP ratio (annualised)
b
gdp 0.53
Fiscal stance parameter d1 1.00
Speed adjustment towards the target debt ratio parameter d2 0.10
41Appendix - Table 2: Steady-state key ratios
Data Model
Expenditure (as a % of GDP)
Private consumption 0.64 0.61
Government consumption and GFCF 0.22 0.21
Private investment 0.21 0.21
Exports 0.29 0.29
Imports 0.37 0.33
Labour income share (as a % of overall income) 0.57 0.56
Tradable goods 0.54 0.54
Non-tradable goods 0.58 0.58
Capital-output ratio (as a % of output) NA 2.34
Tradable goods NA 2.53
Non-tradable goods NA 2.21
Government (as a % of GDP)
Debt stock 0.57 0.53
Fiscal balance -0.07 -0.02
Overall revenues 0.38 0.39
Overall expenditure 0.45 0.41
External account (as a % of GDP)
Net foreign assets -0.60 -0.60
Current account -0.06 -0.02
Trade balance -0.08 -0.04
42non-tradable goods market. As for real rigidities, capital adjustment costs were calibrated
so as to ensure plausible impulse responses in terms of investment volatility. Regarding
nominal rigidities, price growth adjustment costs were calibrated to match average adjust-
ment time spans, in line with what is suggested in the literature. In particular, we impose
that the adjustment of prices in the non-tradable goods sector is slightly slower than in
the tradable goods sector, reecting the fact that ercer competition and lower markups
imply lower price stickiness.
We now consider distributors parameters. In the assemblage stage, the elasticity of
substitution between domestic tradable goods and imports was taken to be identical across
distributors and set above unity, as in most of the literature on open economy DSGE
models (see for instance Coenen et al. (2007), Harrison et al. (2005), Erceg et al. (2000)
or Kumhof et al. (2010)); on the other hand, in the distribution stage, assembled goods
(which are basically a composite tradable good) and non-tradable goods were assumed
to feature a low substitutability as in Mendoza (2005) and Kumhof et al. (2010). The
distribution parameters of the production function in each stage were calibrated to match
the National Accounts import content and non-tradable goods content of each type of
nal good. The degree of monopolistic competition among distributors was assumed to be
lower than among manufacturers, with the steady-state markup being set to 5%, except
in the case of exporters, where ercer competition is likely to determine a lower markup.
In terms of price stickiness, it was assumed that prices take 2 quarters to fully adjust for
all distributors except exporters, whose prices are assumed to adjust faster. Real rigidities
related to the import content adjustment costs were set to ensure a smooth adjustment of
import contents to real exchange rate uctuations.
The steady-state tax rates were calibrated to match the average revenue-to-GDP ratios
observed in the data. The same applies to EU transfers and to expenditure components
(government consumption and investment and government transfers). The parameters
of the scal policy rule were calibrated to ensure a smooth tax adjustment. The target
debt-to-GDP ratio in the steady state was set to 53%, implying a corresponding scal
balance-to-GDP ratio of  2:1%.18
18The values assumed for the debt-to-GDP target and the implied scal balance can be questioned
in view of the medium term objective that has been set by the European Commission for Portugal (a
structural budget balance of  0:5%, implying a debt-to-GDP ratio close to 12%). However, since in the
historical period that was used to calibrate the model the debt-to-GDP ratio averaged 57%, it does not
seem reasonable to calibrate it to match a remarkably dierent gure.
43B Welfare analysis
Welfare analysis can be seen as a benchmark metric for the impact of a particular policy
experiment in social welfare, as measured through the aggregate lifetime utility, which is
a function of goods valued by households (consumption and leisure in the case at hand).
In a general equilibrium framework, welfare can be seen as the present value multiplier
of households' utility (as k ! 1). A widely used metric based on welfare analysis is the
compensated consumption variation in the spirit of Lucas Jr. (1987). In innite horizon
models, it is natural to consider the representative agent utility function as the welfare
criterion (Ganelli 2005). In overlapping generation models, welfare analysis is much less
straightforward, since individuals have nite lifetimes and in each period an innite number
of generations coexist. Hence, the choice of a welfare criteria in these models is far more
debatable than in innitely-lived agents models, since it involves a subjective weighting of
the utility of current and future generations.
In this paper, we use a discrete time counterpart of the suggestion of Calvo and Obstfeld
(1988), which has also been used in the literature (Ganelli 2005, Kumhof et al. 2008). The
method consists in using the utility function of the representative agent, for each period
t, at the average per-capita consumption ( ct+s) and leisure (1    lt+s), where  lt+s stands
for hours worked. Since these gures in period t + s result from optimal decisions of
representative agents of all generations alive in that period, the utility level is a measure
of the average utility level in the period. The synthetic welfare indicator is obtained as a
weighted average of the utility of the individuals alive in the current and in future periods,
where a weighting factor W reects the importance of future generations in the welfare


























Given that the choice of W involves ethical considerations, namely on fairness to-
wards born and unborn generations, we conducted a sensitivity analysis using alternative
discount rates. The benchmark value WB will be the households discount factor corre-
sponding to an annualised discount rate of 6:3%. Alternative schemes are: the steady-state
real market interest rate WK, in line with the rationale proposed in Kaplow (2007) and
used in Kumhof et al. (2008), which corresponds to an annualised discount rate of 2:8%;
a very low discount rate WL = 0:1%, which is closer to the view of Ramsey (1928), who
advocates that all generations should be treated alike; and, nally, a very high discount
rate WH, corresponding to an annual discount rate of 30% that is a proxy for the view of a
very short-sighted government (caring more about the immediate impact of the stimulus,
than for instance on the need to also envisage an adequate exit strategy).
The implied weighting scheme over ten years (40 quarters) is illustrated in Figure
1. The lower the discount rate the more future events matter. For instance, an annual































discount rate of 0:1% implies that events occurring in 10 years ahead are weighted as much
as an event occurring at t = 0, while a discount rate of 30% implies that events occurring
more than 8 years ahead are to a large extent not considered. The average lifetime of
the discount window is simply 1
1 W , implying that it is virtually unlimited in the rst
case and limited to slightly more than 3 years in the last case. The remaining cases lie in
between.
Once the welfare measure is obtained, then the compensating variation can be com-
puted, which consists in expressing welfare gains (losses) in terms of equivalent increase
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